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Abstract: The events triggered by defaults on ‘sub-prime’ mortgages have been widely 
described as constituting a ‘crisis’. But a crisis of what exactly? Several different explanations 
of the 20 month drama that unfolded from summer 2007 have been proposed by a wide 
range of commentators. These include journalists, academics, politicians, business-people, 
pundits and public administrators, among others. This essay parses this superfluity of crisis 
talk into five principal accounts. It focuses on the Anglo-American scene. The 
interpretations presented range from the simplistic and populist to the complex and 
specialised. They are compared and contrasted, and in each case their diverse normative 
implications are sketched. As a Marxist, I argue that the fifth interpretation – which speaks 
to macro-economic imbalances and asymmetries of class power – is the most compelling. 
But I also argue that each of the other interpretations can be narrated and politicised in such 
a way as to advance Left arguments for far-reaching socio-economic reform. Yet, this fact 
notwithstanding, the Left – by which I mean those positioned left of both New Labour and 
the Democrats – has so far failed to use the recent crisis to its political advantage. This, I 
suggest, is a sign of its long-standing marginality in Britain and the US – a marginality so 
entrenched that even an acute economic crisis has been unable to alter it. This crisis thus 
reveals a seeming paradox: the continued strength of neoliberal capitalism despite itself. 
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Introduction 
By spring 2008, the political economic turmoil unleashed by defaults on ‘sub-
prime’ loans in the US was being widely described as a ‘crisis’. Metaphors like 
‘financial firestorm’, ‘credit tsunami’ and ‘economic meltdown’ became 
commonplace in media, political and business circles. Their use was in no way 
hyperbolic: the sudden and unexpected collapse of Lehman Brothers in the 
autumn only served to confirm their appropriateness. Comparisons were being 
made to the Wall Street Crash and the subsequent Great Depression of the 
1930s. These comparisons have proven inaccurate, for the time being – though 
a synchronised global recession of geographically varied seriousness has now 
set-in.  
How are the crisis and its aftermath to be explained, and what are the 
appropriate remedies? Commentators of all stripes have fallen over themselves 
to answer this cardinal question. Newspaper editors, journalists, pundits, 
economists, politicians and many others besides have had their say in books, 
essays, broadcasts, blogs, conferences, workshops and editorials. There’s been a 
superfluity of analysis. Who is one to believe? Most people know little about 
the machinations of investment bankers or ratings agencies, and they rely on 
various ‘experts’ and ‘authorities’ to instruct them in the economic 
fundamentals, such as the drivers of interest rate changes, stock market 
volatility and current account deficits. This epistemic dependence is not 
confined to the billions of people who live-out their lives on Main Street rather 
than Wall Street. Even professionals in the financial sector and wider business 
community look to others – usually members of their peer group – for 
answers. After all, most of them did not see the recent calamity coming (as if 
previous economic crises were somehow unrepeatable precedents of interest 
only to historians). And while academics are trained and employed to 
understand complexity, only a minority of this sizeable community have the 
expertise to understand – in more than a superficial way – why the 2007-09 
crisis occurred. We, too, are reliant on the wisdom of those with the credibility 
to persuade us that their version of events is true. The same might be said of 
most of the activists who have kept that loose international known as the ‘anti-
capitalist’ (or anti-globalisation) movement alive since the late 90s.  
Happy is the world in which alternative accounts of the recent crisis 
might receive equal exposure. They could then be compared and contrasted on 
their merits by those seeking enlightenment. Since value-free analysis is a myth, 
these merits would include open acknowledgement of the various values and 
goals written into the different diagnoses, prognoses and remedies suggested to 
us over the last two years or so. In the real world, however, the argumentative 
playfield is never even. Certain interpretations command widespread attention, 
while others remain marginal. Or, to phrase it somewhat differently, those 
interpretations that command a hearing are, normatively speaking, framed in 
some ways but not others. It was ever thus. 
These observations, it seems to me, provide a fitting context in which to 
make sense of the numerous attempts to explain the 2007-09 crisis, as well as 
their relative efficacy. In this essay I want to parse these attempts, and pick-out 
some of the major interpretations of cause, effect and cure. In each case I 
consider the diverse normative framings possible, and the audiences most likely 
to recognise these interpretations under one or other frame. I focus on the 
Anglo-American scene. This is not a traditional academic review piece. I do not 
confine my attention to analyses of the crisis authored by professional 
researchers, as if other interpretations somehow matter less in shaping 
collective understandings; and I do not pepper the essay with citations. Mine is 
a synopsis of a large and sprawling debate that has unfolded in a range of fora 
and arenas, from the popular to the esoteric. My interest is in how different 
interpretations of the recent crisis have (or have not) been mobilised, and to 
what effect. If the essay seems very didactic, this is intentional – I aim to clarify 
what at times has seemed like a babble of crisis talk. 
As we will see, all the available interpretations of the recent crisis – from 
the most simplistic to the most complex – can in theory be used in the service 
of Left arguments against the current order. Put differently, the crisis can be 
narrated in such a way that both the person on the street and sections of the 
professional classes can be persuaded that a swerve to the Left is necessary and 
desirable. Yet in both Britain and the US, the Left – by which I mean those 
who regard both New Labour and the Democrats as insufficiently radical – 
have been unable to make the political weather (let alone alter the climate). A 
crisis, as Pierre Bourdieu once noted, breaks “the immediate fit between 
subjective structures and objective structures, [and so] destroys self-evidence 
practically” (1977: 168). Towards the end of the essay, I consider in brief why – 
contra Bourdieu’s synonymisation of crisis and opportunity – a gap between 
potentiality and actuality has arisen. The Anglo-American Left must learn the 
lessons contained therein. Otherwise, it is likely to remain wholly marginal for 
another period of years. 
 
Interpretation 1: ‘corrupt and greedy bankers are to blame’ 
The speed with spring 2007 defaults on ‘sub-prime’ American mortgages 
triggered a late year global ‘credit crunch’ left the heads of financiers, regulators 
and politicians spinning. For the average citizen it was even more bewildering, 
or simply bemusing. Talk of leveraged borrowing, derivatives and securitised 
loans made little sense to the person on the street – such as the thousands of 
Northern Rock account holders who, in September 2007, queued to remove 
their savings from what they thought was a dependable high street lender. But 
by the new year, those with little appetite for the intricacies of high finance 
were thrown a gift: something recognisable to blame. Jerome Kerviel, a junior 
futures trader with Société Générale, was arrested in January 2008 for 
(apparently) unauthorised dealing leading to losses of 4.9 billion Euro. But his 
malfeasance was as nothing compared with that of the new poster-boy for 
financial corruption. Bernard Madoff, a highly respected Wall Street investor, 
was sentenced to 150 years in prison for operating the largest Ponzi scheme in 
world history. His prosecutors claimed losses of $65 billion on behalf of their 
now mostly bankrupt clients. Madoff is to the noughties what Nick Leeson was 
to the nineties and Michael Milken was to the eighties. (And let us not forget 
another now infamous American financier, Allen Stafford, who currently 
stands accused of defrauding myriad investors)  
 Unsurprisingly, the tabloid press and the other vox pop parts of the 
news media had a field-day with these cases. They served a pedagogic purpose 
that bookended 2008, after frenetic months when political economic leaders 
and the media had found it easier to describe unfolding events than explain 
them. Kerviel and Madoff’s corruption usefully personalised the causes of a 
crisis that most people simply did not understand. Little matter that both men’s 
actions were largely irrelevant to the liquidity drought that had pitched the 
world’s ‘real economy’ into recession by early 2009. But the search for villains 
did not begin-and-end with a few ‘rogue traders’. Even the most demagogic 
elements of the news media could not pretend that this was the nub of the 
problem. Instead, the spotlight was shone on a broader set of actors and a 
rather different cause: namely, high financiers in general (‘fat cats’) and their 
collective greed in particular.  
 This story-line became a common-place of the low- and middle-brow 
news media throughout 2008 and 2009. For instance, Britain’s most popular 
tabloid newspaper, The Sun, repeatedly invoked the image of City bankers as 
pigs gorging themselves in troughs of money. The attribution of collective 
blame typically focussed on two things. First, it was suggested that pretty much 
the entire financial class was guilty of reckless self-aggrandizement. In Britain, 
the way Northern Rock’s former chief executive Adam Applegarth was 
pilloried in the gutter press from late 2007 was emblematic of this. Once it 
became clear – by early 2008 – that virtually every high street and investment 
bank had engaged in high-risk lending practices, blaming a few individuals like 
Applegarth became rather pointless (even as it satisfied public bloodlust). The 
collective guilt thesis was dramatised in February 2008, when the leaders of 
HBOS and Royal Bank of Scotland were cross-examined by the Treasury Select 
Committee of the House of Commons. The four chief bankers under the 
spotlight all issued a public apology for the harm their lack of proper oversight 
had caused. In the US, the likes of Merrill’s Stan O’Neal and Citigroup’s Chuck 
Price either felt compelled to resign or were ousted. At the time of writing, 
Lloyd Blankfein, James Dimon, John Mack and Brian Moynihan publicly 
admitted their banks’ strategic errors, under cross-examination by the 
Congressional Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. This was, evidently, a 
problem caused not by a few reckless financiers but by almost all of those 
found in banking’s upper echelons.     
 If such apologies served to locate blame at the level of chief executives 
and their boards, the notion that greed was a key driver was seemingly 
evidenced time and again through 2008 and the early part of 2009. This brings 
us to the second focus of the selfish bankers storyline: the huge severance 
packages given to the senior financiers who had led their companies – and the 
wider world economy – over the cliff. The sense of public outrage about this 
was intensified by the extraordinary fiscal and monetary measures that public 
authorities worldwide put in place to rescue the financial system: this meant, in 
effect, that tax-payers were richly rewarding already uber-wealthy executives for 
their catastrophic failures. In Britain, former RBS chief Fred Goodwin became 
a cause celebre, with his Edinburgh home requiring a police guard once details 
of his exorbitant pension payment were reported in the media. In the US, the 
newly installed President sensed the public mood when (in spring 2009) he 
strongly criticised those running insurer AIG for awarding lavish employee 
bonuses – this when the firm still required federal government funds to survive. 
These bonuses continue to be awarded by the big banks, most recently 
Barclays (at the time of writing). This led several journalists to coin a sardonic 
new acronym for 2009: BAB (‘bonuses are back’). 
 For all its popular appeal, it is not difficult to point out the analytical 
deficiencies of the ‘corrupt and greedy bankers’ narrative. While high finance’s 
‘masters of the universe’ must certainly take responsibility for their reckless 
actions, to abstract them as a group from the wider political economy serves to 
obscure a number of important factors (to be discussed later). ‘Greed’ is not 
much of an explanatory category either, implying as it does some transhistorical 
human impulse that threatens to manifest itself in the absence of proper checks. 
Even so, the idea that individual corruption and collective greed together 
explain the recent economic crisis is undeniably powerful. Its relative simplicity 
makes it easy for mass audiences to understand; its focus on individuals and 
their wider clique taps-in to a venerable public need to identify villains; and, at 
the end of the day, the idea is easy for those promoting it to evidence. On top 
of this, it has widespread political appeal: it resonates with conservatives, 
liberals and social democrats alike. In Britain, for instance, New Labour has 
had cause to use it on occasion (no doubt to deflect attention from its own role 
in deregulating City finance from 1997 onwards), while the Conservatives have 
found it very helpful in attempts to win over potential voters in the run-up to a 
general election. Outside the political mainstream, Interpretation 1 can also 
prove strategically useful to radicals on both the Left and the Right. In 
normative terms, it licenses punitive action against bankers (of the sort meted 
out to Madoff) who must be ‘reigned in’ and ‘held to account’. That regulators 
and legislators have thus far done little to punish financial high-flyers only 
serves to further dismay large sections of the general public. At the time of 
writing (December 2009), critics are still pressing the Obama and Brown 
administrations to put Wall Street and City fat cats on a stringent diet overseen 
by more rigorous regulators. New Labour has thus far travelled further down 
this road – at least rhetorically – than has the White House. This said, Obama 
is presently making noises about imposing new taxes on US financiers. 
 
Interpretation 2: ‘light touch’ regulation is to blame 
Soon after the ‘credit crunch’ set-in, many in the worlds of business, politics, 
academia and the serious news media began to talk about financial ‘regulation’ 
– the lack of it, to be precise – as the principal problem. Such talk sounds dry 
and overly technical to the average person. But it is meat-and-drink to that 
significant minority of people who play very close attention to how business 
practice is governed by public authorities. These people include economics 
correspondents who ply their trade outside the populist sections of the media; 
business professionals in the financial sector and beyond; elected and 
appointed public servants tasked with the job of oversight; and social scientists 
based in think tanks, foundations, economics departments and business 
schools. If publications like The Economist, the Financial Times and Business Week 
are anything to go by, ‘regulatory failure’ has become a favoured explanation 
among large sections of the world’s political economic elite and the business 
commentariat. In simple terms, the argument is that too much commercial 
freedom was afforded to financiers large, medium and small. Former House 
speaker Newt Gingrich phrased it thus: the current crisis, he opined, “is a 
government problem, not a market problem” (cited in Freeland, 2009: 22). The 
liberal-left Guardian newspaper economics editor – no friend of Gingrich – 
agrees: “The reason for the crisis was not that the state was too active, but that 
it was too passive” (Elliott, 2009: 28). 
 This interpretation has considerable empirical warrant. The so-called 
‘high risk, high reward’ approach to finance was indulged by regulators and law 
makers worldwide for over 20 years. Indeed, it was in one sense created by them 
– Clinton’s repeal of the Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 being a 
signal example. In the US and Britain, where global banking assumes huge 
national importance, the good times yielded colossal tax returns for central 
government, thousands of largely well-paid financial services jobs, and an 
associated ‘wealth effect’ as Wall Street and City employees spent their 
considerable earnings. But the price of success was a misplaced belief that the 
interests of finance capital were coincident with the public interest. Regulatory 
under-sight became normalised. Examples abound and have been easy for 
proponents of the ‘under-regulation’ interpretation to cite. For instance, in 
recent years law makers and regulators in the Anglo-American world have: 
removed the firewall separating high street and investment banks; allowed 
excessive leverage, with some banks having debt-to-equity ratios as high as 30:1; 
permitted the proliferation of complex financial instruments such as 
collateralised debt obligations and credit default swaps; sanctioned a reward 
structure in which finance professionals are richly remunerated for making 
continuous, short-term gain for their investors and shareholders; allowed ‘too 
large to fail’ banks to form through mergers and acquisitions; raised no 
objections to financial institutions that seek – as a core business objective – 
returns on very high risk investments; not objected to hand-in-glove 
relationships between credit ratings agencies, companies insuring against non-
performing investments and the international banks; and sanctioned the 
emergence of a so-called ‘shadow banking system’ in which ‘special investment 
vehicles’ operated with almost no public accountability.  
 In the detail, the charge-sheet is very long, but it reduces to two 
principal claims. First, that politicians and public administrators were far too 
trusting in finance capital’s powers of ‘self-regulation’, based on the so-called 
‘efficient markets hypothesis’ (which says that financial markets produce 
sufficient information to continuously self-correct). The first chairman of 
Britain’s Financial Services Authority (FSA), Sir Howard Davies, summarised 
this faith in the invisible hand with striking candour. “The philosophy from 
when I set it up”, he admitted in 2008, “has been to say ‘Consenting adults in 
private? That’s their problem really’” (cited in Wade, 2008: 13). The second 
major charge is that gaps in regulatory oversight were allowed to develop. For 
instance, reflecting on the post-1997 division of labour between the Bank of 
England and the FSA, the Bank’s deputy governor Paul Tucker said that “we 
left an underlap between us” (cited in Moya, 2009: 23). He was referring to the 
Authority’s micro-regulatory focus on individual banks and the Bank’s macro-
regulatory focus on keeping inflation low: this meant that neither organisation 
was tasked with monitoring or addressing a build-up of systemic risk across the 
banking sector as a whole. Of course, one could simply argue that regulatory 
negligence was the real cause – an example being Alan Greenspan’s decision to 
ignore credit- and asset-bubbles during his Fed tenure, as if they didn’t really 
matter.   
As with Interpretation 1 of the recent crisis, the ‘light touch’ regulation 
narrative is polyvalent in the political sense. Those who signed-up to ‘self-
regulating’ finance from the get-go have been able offer-up mea culpas in its 
name, just as much as their critics have used it to say ‘We told you so’. The 
difference lies in their preferred solutions. Students of J.K. Galbraith, Keynes 
and the American economist Hyman Minsky – such as The Guardian’s Larry 
Elliott – have called for a ‘new financial architecture’ whose principles and 
institutions would protect the public interest against the private agendas of 
risk-taking banks. Even some of those directly responsible for regulatory failure 
were, in the dark days of late 2008, given to such talk (Gordon Brown being a 
prime example, and who has returned to the theme in the run-up to the general 
election). In addition, realists and pragmatists in the Marxian camp and on the 
socialist Left see the tactical sense in beefing-up financial regulation. Among 
the measures suggested have been a new Glass-Steagall Act, far tougher capital 
adequacy requirements and accounting standards, the outlawing of ‘off-
balance-sheet’ banking, the de-universalisation of the short-term ‘shareholder 
value’ investment model, greater consumer protection from ‘predatory lending’, 
the break-up of overly large banks, and the creation of a ‘Tobin tax’ on certain 
cross-border financial transactions. There have been many other suggestions 
besides. In virtually every case, the policies would have to be implemented and 
enforced internationally. One of the remarkable oddities of recent history is 
that while finance capital has been borderless, its regulation has remained 
largely in the hands of national bodies like the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission.   
These muscular proposals for change have so far fallen on deaf ears. As 
I noted above, the normative lessons of the ‘under-regulation’ narrative can 
easily be made consistent with the aspirations of those who do not want the 
visible hand of the state ‘interfering’ too much with finance capital’s operations. 
The new FSA banking code is a case in point. Issued in August 2009, it sets out 
eight principles that should govern the operation of City banks and sets new 
standards of information sharing and transparency. But it falls far short of the 
sort of meaty measures called for by proponents of a new financial architecture. 
Journalist John Kampfner dismissed it as “a gentle entreaty to Britain’s 
financial services industry to behave better” (2009: 26). The reason, it has been 
widely suggested, is politicians’ fear of City and Wall Street jobs disappearing 
overseas to financial centres with less stringent regulatory requirements. This, 
presumably, drove Alistair Darling and Tim Geithner to face-down the call of 
premiers Sarkozy and Merkel to mandatorily control bankers’ bonuses at the 
September 2009 G20 meeting. Both men favour voluntary measures, even 
though Darling hardened his own rhetoric through the autumn and winter 
leading to the imposition of a one-off ‘windfall tax’ on City earnings. The 
policy debate that divides those otherwise persuaded by the ‘regulatory failure’ 
interpretation is thus focussed on the following technical question: how much 
financial regulation, of what sort, and at what geographical scale?  
 
Interpretation 3: ‘casino finance’ is to blame 
Regulation requires two parties: regulators and the regulated. The third 
interpretation is really the flip-side of the second, and has been advanced by 
those who prefer, for whatever reason, to emphasise structural problems 
within the financial sector. This interpretation focuses on the ‘rational 
irrationality’ of banks and related private sector actors. The spotlight is here 
trained on how financial operators chose to exercise the freedom afforded to 
them by permissive regulators. Unlike the rather populist Interpretation 1, this 
one backgrounds greed and foregrounds a tragedy of the financial commons in 
which a frantic race for profit ultimately brought ruin to all. In October 2008 
Congressional testimony, former Federal Reserve Bank chairman Alan 
Greenspan suggested these operators had ‘underpriced’ the systemic risk their 
own actions created – perhaps trying to deflect attention from his own lapses 
as Fed chairman during the Clinton era. Those less intimate with the world of 
high finance have preferred to use gambling analogies. For instance, the widely 
respected MP Vince Cable – Treasury spokesman for the British LibDem Party 
– has frequently compared modern financiers to those who frequent casinos 
(echoing Susan Strange, author of the prescient Casino capitalism [1997]). 
Once again, the evidence to support this interpretation of events is not 
hard to seek. Given a lax regulatory environment, it’s no surprise that 
individual financial institutions entered into a competitive battle in which 
‘financial innovation’ was seen as a key to success. The ‘originate and distribute’ 
approach to asset-backed securities is one of many cases in point. This 
approach became commonplace from the early 1990s, with City and Wall 
Street financiers in the vanguard. Traditional banks used to offer loans from 
depositors’ savings, and received their returns direct from clients over a period 
of months or years. The post-traditional banks of the last 20 years preferred to 
repackage loans and divide them into tranches to be sold-on immediately to 
institutional investors, pension fund managers or other financial institutions. 
These tranches were hedged against defaults by taking out insurance, and their 
cost to investors varied depending on the levels of risk and reward involved. By 
distributing the risks of potentially non-performing loans far and wide, the 
originators of tranches enjoyed instant returns on their lending while 
minimising their own vulnerability to defaults. They also off-loaded debt, 
enabling them to lend more money and do more business in a seemingly 
virtuous spiral. The problem, however, is that they were emboldened to seek-
out ever riskier lending opportunities – such as sub-prime mortgages – in the 
belief that any resulting problems would be diffused across the entire financial 
system. As it turned out, the problems infected the system rather than being – as 
per the expectation – absorbed by it. 
The dysfunctionality of the originate and distribute practices pursued by 
banks is but one example of what, in retrospect, looks like a form of 
widespread madness within the financial sector. But to call it madness is too 
easy. According to the third interpretation of crisis, it’s better seen as a case of 
collective irrationality wherein individual banks continued to push the envelope 
so long as the profits came rolling in. In Robin Blackburn’s words, “if [finance 
capital] is unaccountable and unregulated it becomes sovereign in the capital 
re-allocation process, and … grab[s] the lion’s share of the gains it makes 
possible, including anticipated gains before they have been realised” (2008: 84). 
An awful lot of brain power and ingenuity went into creating the family of 
complex financial products and practices whose names are now tainted (‘over 
the counter trades’, hedge funds etc.). And an awful lot of money was made, 
for financial institutions, their shareholders and their many clients. In a sense, 
the numerous innovations conjured-up by traders, dealers, brokers and all the 
rest ‘worked’. And because they worked no one bank or bond insurer or ratings 
agency was prepared to call time on them, even though the party had to end 
sometime – just as the ‘roaring 20s’ came to an abrupt halt by that decade’s end, 
presaging the grim and ultimately incendiary 1930s. 
As with Interpretation 2, the precise normative and policy implications 
of Interpretation 3 are rather varied. It licenses more-or-less intrusive 
regulation by public authorities, but at a minimum suggests that certain 
financial products and practices are far too risky to continue unabated. As 
Adair Turner, head of the FSA, said in August this year (much to the City’s 
consternation and perhaps betraying his frustration at the toothlessness of the 
new FSA Code he’d just signed off on): far too many financial services are 
‘socially useless’. As such, this interpretation resonates with those who favour 
rather mild or very strong reform alike. Chastened free marketers and those 
(Left or Right) in favour of less business-friendly regulation can relate to the 
casino finance narrative equally. The need for some form of ‘macro-prudential 
regulation’ of the banks has been their mantra. These banks, the argument goes, 
must be made more ‘moral’ and obliged to rediscover a sense of their proper 
role in sustaining both real economic activity and social stability. Like the ‘light 
touch’ regulation narrative, Interpretation 3 focuses squarely on the financial 
sector per se and its governance. This is a strength – after all, regulators and 
financiers must take considerable responsibility for their reckless (in)actions. 
But it is also a weakness – at least from the perspective of the next 
interpretation. For it brackets-out a whole set of absolutely critical 
considerations, leading Jean Pisani-Ferry and Indhira Santos to opine that “… 
many analysts have failed to grasp fully the character of the [recent] crisis” 
(2009: 9).   
 
Interpretation 4: macro-economic imbalances are to blame 
The fourth interpretation of the recent crisis aims to set finance capital in a 
wider economic context. As such, it folds interpretations two and three 
together and shows them to be but elements of a much larger story. This 
interpretation has been voiced by a number of individuals within the worlds of 
business journalism, politics and financial regulation; and it has been articulated 
by a number of analysts located in think tanks and universities. It is a rather 
technical, big picture interpretation that most members of the general public 
are only dimly aware of. It speaks to grand questions of economic history and 
geography rather than questions of micro-finance, regulatory procedure or 
bankers’ presumed motives. One of its more famous proponents summarises it 
well: “Today’s credit crisis”, writes Martin Wolf in Fixing global finance, “is a 
symptom of an unbalanced world economy” (2008: 5). 
 This interpretation’s starting point is the excess liquidity sloshing around 
the global economy this last twenty years or so. Without this liquidity, the 
financial sector would not have had the raw material needed to put its various 
complex instruments to work. From where did this liquidity originate? Two 
main sources: namely, the Middle East – reaping the continued rewards of oil 
exports – and several Far Eastern countries, whose growth has been based to a 
large extent on manufacturing exports. The latter include China, still the 
world’s fastest growing economy, and Japan, still one of the world’s largest 
economies even after its ‘lost decade’ triggered by a bursting property bubble 
15 years ago. Why did countries in these two regions elect to run trade 
surpluses? In the Middle East there was little choice: the benefits of controlling 
oil needed by the rest of the world guaranteed colossal revenue streams relative 
to levels of domestic investment and consumption. In the Far East, one must 
look to the economic crisis of 1997-8 and the earlier Japanese crisis. These 
persuaded policy makers of the need to save for a rainy day and, specifically, of 
the need to convert surpluses into the world’s ‘universal’ (or ‘reserve’) currency, 
the US dollar. These measures would help stabilise the value of domestic 
money and insure against speculative attacks on home currencies. Though not 
badly affected by the 1997-8 meltdown, these lessons were learned by the 
Chinese too. 
 How was this achieved? To earn dollars several Far Eastern countries 
fixed the exchange rate of their domestic currencies to the dollar at a 
favourable level. This ensured that their exports to the US – still the world’s 
largest economy, even in the current recession – remained affordable for 
American consumers. So too did their relatively cheap labour costs (Japan 
excepted), giving them a competitive advantage over many other overseas 
producers. The resulting dollar surpluses were either used to pay-off 
outstanding debts, hoarded, invested or lent to others. The most significant of 
these ‘others’ was the United States. After the dot.com bubble burst in the 
early noughties, direct foreign investment in the American economy became 
much less attractive. So East Asian countries (and some Middle Eastern ones) 
began to buy US Treasury bonds – traditionally, a reliable source of long-term 
income. This was (and remains) especially true of China. These bonds were 
issued readily by successive US administrations in need of liquidity to fund tax 
cuts and the high costs of government, including wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Because this liquidity originated overseas, it did not raise the costs of domestic 
borrowing (which would’ve occurred had the government sourced money from 
US savers). Interest rates thus remained low, enabling financial institutions 
within and connected to Wall Street to expand their deposits and loans greatly. 
So it was that surpluses accumulated on one side of the world became 
transferred en masse to fund the US fiscal deficit, which led to cheap money 
for the domestic banks to spend. A good deal of this money went into US 
consumer borrowing and housing, so maintaining American demand for 
imports from Far and Middle Eastern countries.    
 This interpretation of the ‘deep causes’ of the recent crisis can be looked 
at from two angles. The ‘savings glut’ perspective blames those economies who 
accumulated large dollar surpluses. They are charged with obliging the US to be 
‘consumer of the last resort’, a role it took-on to avoid global deflation. They 
should, the argument goes, have spent more and lent less. Successive chairman 
of the Federal Reserve Bank been notable authors of this perspective. The 
‘money glut’ perspective looks at the coin from the other side. It points a finger 
at Washington DC. By running unprecedented trade deficits, the federal 
government is charged with living beyond its means. Maintaining the dollar’s 
strength against a number of currencies also made it more difficult for its 
export industries to earn overseas revenue, while benefiting dollar-rich Wall 
Street banks in their foreign ventures. In addition, the weak industrial policy of 
all White House administrations since Carter’s meant a lack of strategic 
investment in new industries located in the ‘real economy’. However, Wall 
Street is not let off the hook. Benefitting from the low interest rates set by Alan 
Greenspan, the financial sector could arguably have invested in new productive 
activities with high export potential. Instead, a consumer credit and housing 
bubble was produced – sub-prime mortgages being one part of this. In Britain, 
New Labour, the Bank of England and the City were responsible for similar 
policies being pursued. Indeed, the ‘money glut’ perspective is consistent with 
the idea of a ‘First World debt crisis’, centred on the Anglo-American zone and 
fuelled by Japan and numerous developing world lenders (see Sideri, 2009).  
 Clearly, the normative implications of Interpretation 4 are far-reaching 
and appeal to those given – by inclination or profession – to strategising about 
geopolitics and geoeconomics. Critics of the US, but also many within the 
American establishment, have argued that it can no longer live beyond its 
means. It must rebalance its books, devalue its currency, invest more in value-
creating business ventures, and even relinquish the right of ‘seigniorage’. This is 
consistent with the ‘money glut’ perspective. One the other side, advocates of 
the ‘savings glut’ perspective argue that large trade surplus economies must 
(among other things) inflate their currencies, tolerate a dollar deflation, invest 
more at home, increase domestic wages and fund major public works in order 
to stimulate demand. What unites the two perspectives on Interpretation 4 is a 
recognition that global institutional reform is required that extends way beyond 
rethinking how finance per se is governed. Tinkering with the remit of the 
G20’s newly minted Financial Stability Board (formerly the G7’s Financial 
Stability Forum) or the EU’s proposed Systemic Risk Board is thus not nearly 
enough. Nor will Gordon Brown’s recent agitation for a global Tobin tax do 
the trick. A modern-day Bretton Woods regime has been called for – only this 
time, a ‘global new deal’ would not be organised around US hegemony, and 
global governance institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and a new 
World Financial Authority would reflect this change of circumstance. They 
would be democratic and pluralistic organisations dedicated to managing global 
affairs in the interests of numerous countries and power blocs. 
 Relative to all the previous interpretations of the recent financial crisis, 
the fourth adds a much-needed macro-economic, geopolitical and historical 
dimension. Its advocates consider it superior on these grounds, and there is 
copious evidence to support either the savings or money glut versions of the 
thesis. Economic nationalists can derive strategic lessons from this 
interpretation germane to their own country’s future, while internationalists can 
argue for a managed transition away from US dominance. However, its 
complexity ensures that this interpretation lacks the popular resonance of 
Interpretation 1. It is an interpretation operative only among those versed in 
the technicalities of global political economy – the sort of people who read The 
Economist, UNCTAD reports or academic journal essays about world affairs 
(like this one). This also applies to the fifth and final interpretation of the 2007-
09 meltdown. The difference, as we will now see, is that it is strongly favoured 
by commentators on both the reformist and revolutionary wings of the Left. 
This is because it supplements Interpretation 4 with concepts and evidence that 
further radicalise its already considerable normative implications. 
  
Interpretation 5: Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism is to blame 
The fifth take on the recent crisis has been put forward by several academics 
influenced by Marxism,1 but also by some outside universities who criticise 
neoliberalism in the name of a more socially just model of capitalism – such as 
financial analyst Graham Turner, author of The Credit Crunch (2008). This 
interpretation has not been loudly voiced in business circles or mainstream 
politics, let alone the mass media. But one or two notables within the political 
economic establishment have been prepared to lend it credence – such as the 
distinguished British ex-civil servant Sir Tim Lankester (2009). 
 The key to this interpretation is the 1970s, which is the last time the 
Western economies experienced a coordinated recession akin to today’s. Forty 
years ago, the post-war Keynesian compact began to crumble. The leading 
capitalist economies experienced varying degrees of stagflation: weak economic 
growth accompanied by rising prices. The crisis proved an opportunity for 
‘neoliberal’ thinking to enter the fray, notably in the US and UK from 1979 
onwards. In the name of personal and corporate ‘freedom’, the neoliberal 
programme emphasised the need to remove ‘barriers’ to free trade. It replaced 
the Keynesian focus on demand management with a concern to keep inflation 
                                                 
1I’m thinking, for example, of Bellamy Foster and Magdoff’s (2009) The great financial crisis and 
Richard Wolff’s (2009) Capitalism hits the fan: The global economic meltdown and what to do about it. There is 
also Neil Smith’s classically Marxist interpretation of the switch of capital into ‘unproductive’ finance, 
advanced in the pages of this journal (Smith, 2008). Kevin Cox has also advanced related arguments 
in this journal, detailing the changing geography of investment and profitability as it relates to 
declining US hegemony (Cox, 2009).   
low at all costs, by controlling the money supply. As the Reagan and Thatcher 
administrations showed, domestically this meant destroying most of the norms 
and institution of post-war managed (or ‘embedded’) capitalism. Trade union 
power was assailed, many ‘unproductive’ industries allowed to perish, labour 
markets ‘deregulated’, wage controls removed, tax breaks given to the 
corporate sector, and many state activities privatised or contracted out. This 
domestic agenda was scaled-up to the international level in the form of what 
later became known as ‘globalization’. From the early 1980s, Washington 
pressed its allies to remove restrictions on international trade, lending and 
investment – with Britain an influential comrade-in-arms. The hope was that 
Anglo-Saxon capitalism could create new lucrative pockets of comparative 
economic advantage by trading in an expanded world system.  
But there were other reasons too. High labour costs in both countries 
combined with decreasing unit transportation costs and new 
telecommunications meant that domestic producers began to see geographic 
relocation and FDI as feasible strategies. In addition, even as their economies 
were in recession through the late 70s and early 80s, America and Britain 
retained their historic strength in banking and financial services. They used this 
to international advantage by progressively deregulating Wall Street and the 
City, and making them the centre of global liquidity flows. From the early 70s, 
both places became switching points in the world economy, re-channeling 
rivers of money from newly enriched oil states and ‘tiger economies’ to other 
parts of the world. The collapse of the former communist bloc and the end of 
Chinese isolation simply reinforced their centrality from the late 1980s onwards. 
The greater New York region and the south east of England duly felt the 
benefits, as did the national treasuries receiving tax revenues. 
 What were the long-term effects of the neoliberal turn in the US and 
Britain? Less than salutary, according to proponents of Interpretation 5. First, 
both economies became far too reliant on finance, construction and retail, and 
failed to invest sufficiently in new ventures that could set domestic 
accumulation on a profitable, post-industrial path. Second, both countries’ 
manufacturing base was eviscerated, with many home-grown producers 
electing to invest overseas – in Britain, Dyson (maker of vacuum cleaners) 
became a well known example, repeating what iconic manufacturer General 
Motors had been doing for years by decamping to Mexico and elsewhere. 
Thirdly, the share of national wealth accruing to working people declined 
relative to that of those owning or running capitalist enterprises. This has been 
documented by Robert Pollin (2003), Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy 
(2004) – among many others. According to David Harvey, in A brief history of 
neoliberalism (2005), this amounts to a restoration of class power in the 
neoliberal heartlands, but elsewhere besides. This new wealth inequality in the 
US and Britain – so Interpretation 5 goes – was achieved courtesy of four 
things: (i) China’s arrival on the world stage along with other low cost 
exporters kept consumer prices down and weakened demands for wage hikes; 
(ii) the credible threat of capital flight from the US and UK gave employers 
considerable power over their workforces; (iii) easy credit provided by City and 
Wall Street lenders, in a low interest environment, helped to conceal the fact of 
low wages for working class and lower middle class people (and created a false 
sense of personal wealth);  and (iv) the defeat of the trades unions during the 
1980s and the move to ‘flexible’ labour markets played havoc with the 
organisational capacities of the (increasingly indebted) average working person.   
 In sum, proponents of Interpretation 5 argue that, post the 1970s crisis, 
neoliberal policies succeeded in delivering economic growth in a range of 
countries worldwide – including the two major proponents of laissez faire 
capitalism. However, because the benefits of growth were skewed grotesquely 
in favour of the rich, the resulting ‘demand gap’ found in the American and 
British populations was filled by saddling households with debt. Meanwhile, 
new working populations in China, the Far East and the former communist 
bloc have been made to accept low wages as the price for export-led growth. 
To be sure, many of these workers have been lifted out of poverty by selling 
their labour power. But relative to the wealth created by their collective 
workplace efforts, they have enjoyed meagre rewards. Unlike 40 years ago, this 
crisis stems in large part from the weakness of wage labour. The fact that 
defaults on sub-prime mortgages made to ‘ninjas’ lit the financial tinder 
indicates as much (‘ninjas’ is a US mortgage brokers’ term for people with no 
income, no job and no assets). 
 As I said above, proponents of Interpretation 5 add some missing 
ingredients to an otherwise persuasive Interpretation 4. They also, as I 
additionally indicated, tend not be those working in or around the worlds of 
politics, finance and commodity production. For reformist proponents of 
Interpretation 5, a managed sharing of economic and political power between 
the US and other major players – like Russia, Japan, the EU and China – 
should be accompanied by robust measures to stimulate domestic demand 
worldwide. A precondition of this would be a redistribution of wealth towards 
ordinary workers, increased public control of key economic sectors, and a new 
ethic that values greater social equality over the responsibilities and freedoms 
of individuals. These arguments do not chime with the thinking of business, 
media and political elites in the major capitalist states – notwithstanding the 
pseudo-Keynesian rescue packages thrown at high finance. Revolutionary 
proponents of Interpretation 5 go even further, unsurprisingly. For them, the 
current crisis is simply one of several ways in which the ineluctable 
contradictions of capitalism can play-out. Here is Geoff Mann, writing in New 
Left Review: “… regulation cannot be enough … The overthrow of capital’s rule 
is literally the only way out” (2009: 126). Such an overthrow, clearly, would 
require coordinated radical action globally, led by a resurgent labour movement 
and/or a more tightly organised ‘anti-globalization’ movement. The prospects 
of this are, needless to say, vanishingly small. As Slavoj Zizek once said, it 
remains far easier to image the end of the world than it does the end of 
capitalism. 
 
The dynamics of explanation and evaluation 
“The present-day plunge into the economic abyss”, writes R Taggart Murphy 
in New Left Review, “has … brought forth a smorgasbord of assertions about 
‘the’ cause” (2009: 149). In the previous pages, I’ve presented what I take to be 
the principal extant interpretations of the recent financial crisis. They are not 
mutually exclusive, but they seem to me to be relatively distinct. These 
interpretations have been variously promoted (and sometimes combined) by a 
range of commentators who, depending on their social location, speak to 
more-or-less sizeable, more-or-less knowledgeable audiences ranged across the 
spectrum of political belief. Within its own terms of intellectual reference, each 
interpretation has a certain plausibility. They can all be copiously evidenced and 
almost all are normatively underdetermined, meaning that (especially in the first 
three cases) they can speak to the moral-political sentiments of very different 
sections of the populations affected by the financial meltdown of 2007-09. 
Their normative framing is thus up for grabs.  
They can even be combined into an omnibus explanation, should one 
have the stomach for such an indigestible thing. Here, for example, is Czech 
Prime Minister Jan Fischer speaking at London’s Chatman House in March 
2009: “the financial crisis”, he said, resulted from an exceedingly complex 
interaction of market failures, global financial and monetary imbalances, 
inappropriate regulation, weak supervision and poor macro-prudential 
oversight.” However, it seems to me that this catch-all account detracts from 
efforts to identify proximate and deep causes and to enumerate real policy 
alternatives moving forward. There is a big difference between privileging one 
of the five interpretations I’ve identified, blending some of them for intellectual 
or strategic reasons, and marrying them all together for the sake of apparent 
comprehensiveness. 
  Having remained studiously neutral in the previous five sections, let me 
now come clean and reiterate my own analytical and political allegiances – 
which I flagged briefly in the introduction to this essay. It seems to me that 
while the second and third interpretations speak to the proximate causes of the 
recent crisis, and while the first has obvious popular appeal, the fifth is the 
most telling of all when seen as a necessary extension of the fourth. I offer this 
judgement not on purely cognitive grounds, as if evidence and logic alone can 
distinguish ‘stronger’ from ‘weaker’ interpretations. The fourth and fifth 
interpretations offer us a wide-angle lens on the recent crisis, but this breadth is 
not enough to justify their superiority or persuasiveness. It is also a question of 
politics and values. The economic growth achieved prior to the current 
recession was accompanied by a systematic redistribution of wealth that greatly 
favoured the rich, within and without the financial sector – this was no 
accident and it was morally unacceptable. At base, the 2007-09 crisis was one 
of a class-based neoliberalism led by the US (and secondarily Britain) – a 
project that ultimately failed to manage the venerable overaccumulation 
tendencies of capitalism on a world-scale. To my mind, only in this context do 
otherwise valid criticisms of ‘fat cats’, light touch regulation and casino banking 
(Interpretations 1-3) make real sense and generate the ‘right’ normative 
implications. 
 This said, only a minority of people are ever likely to find Interpretation 
5 compelling (including, I would hope, readers of this journal). In the Anglo-
American context, it is too far reaching and radical in its analysis and 
implications to be palatable for those atop New Labour or the Democrats – 
the two established Left parties in Britain and the US. It speaks more to 
intellectuals and activists who are well to the Left of either party, or who exist 
uneasily within them. And it is, of course, far too esoteric to be readily 
communicable to the average person – even a simplified version would likely 
lack sufficient clarity to speak to the head or heart of a typical voter, worker or 
citizen. This is why advocates of Interpretation 5 would – on strategic grounds 
– need to support any and all attempts to frame Interpretations 1, 2 and 3 in 
broadly Left-wing ways. It would be quite wrong to dismiss this trio because of 
their simplicity or narrowness. As I said earlier, each of these interpretations 
can be made consistent with a political agenda focussed on curbing excess 
personal wealth, reviving a strong conception of the public good, and fostering 
far greater social equality.  
The question then arises: why has the recent crisis not proven to be a 
moment of opportunity for those who, like this author, favour a sharp turn to 
the political Left in the Anglo-American world (and indeed beyond)? Why, in 
other words, has the Left outside the political mainstream proven unable, so 
far, to narrate the recent crisis in ways that repopularise classic arguments 
against ‘free market capitalism’? The answers to these questions are complex 
and they vary considerably in the detail depending on whether one is discussing 
the US or Britain. Getting the answers right clearly matters a great deal. 
Thinkers and activists on the Left (and other radicals too, like US 
neoliberalism’s Godfather Milton Friedman) have long regarded crises as 
moments of real opportunity. But some, like Antonio Gramsci, long ago 
realised that the existing order will not dissolve quickly or readily – even in the 
face of acute problems like those recently evident in the global financial system. 
As I have tried to show, it is perfectly possible to narrate the 2007-09 in 
politically radical ways – it’s not for want of evidence, arguments or ideas that 
the financial crisis has not yet proven opportune for the Left.  
This means that we must look to other factors in order to answer the 
questions just posed. These factors await exploration in another essay, and are 
already preoccupying a fair number of commentators. But they surely include 
organisational and financial weaknesses within what remains a very fragmented 
Left; the fact that New Labour’s and Bush/Obama’s rescue packages have 
taken the edge off the crisis, thus defusing some of the public’s anger; the fact 
that simply coping with the fall-out of what’s happened (e.g. a sharp rise in 
unemployment levels) is preoccupying many individuals, families and 
communities; the deep sedimentation of liberal values on both sides of the 
Atlantic, such that Left ideals of equality and mutuality seem relatively 
unappealing – even at a time when those ideals would challenge the assumption 
that we should deal with the fall-out of the crisis as individuals rather than as 
members of a genuine public; the comparative visibility and strength of 
conservative and even nationalist parties and groups in both countries; the fact 
that a whole generation of younger workers, consumers and citizens enjoyed 
the fruits of the long boom and have no historic memory of poverty, mass 
unemployment, collectivist action or political militancy; the fact that New 
Labour and the post-Carter Democrats stole the Left’s rhetoric and deprived 
many otherwise progressive voters of a more robust sense of a ‘proper’ Left 
programme; and the fact that politics now seems remote from many peoples’ 
lives, reflecting in part a new grassroots cynicism that citizens’ wishes no longer 
count for much in either Westminster or Washington. 
Looking ahead, we are now entering a period where public spending will 
have to contract sharply on both sides of the Atlantic. If the Conservatives 
assume power in Britain, this will no doubt be justified using elements of the 
discursive repertoire of neoliberalism – such as reducing ‘big government’ and 
‘freeing’ firms and workers to employ their capital and ingenuity without undue 
‘interference’. There will also likely be a serious further discrediting of New 
Labour (whose image is already in tatters), based on the argument that it was a 
Left government that sustained high public spending only by turning a blind 
eye to finance capital’s excesses. Indeed, after a failed second attempt to unseat 
Gordon Brown (in January 2010), New Labour’s election team took a Blairite 
turn and eschewed the neo-Keynesian rhetoric of 2009 in the hope of wooing 
voters. Regardless, and in both Britain and the US, it will be the state apparatus 
itself that becomes increasingly politicised – perhaps to the point where it 
suffers an acute legitimacy crisis. Yet it is precisely this institution that requires 
a high level of both resources and public trust to deliver any meaningful Left 
political programme.  
 
Conclusion 
This essay had one major objective. Different explanations of the recent 
financial crisis were summarised, along with their various policy implications. I 
suggested that, on both cognitive and normative grounds, Interpretation 5 is 
the most powerful when seen as an extension of the fourth. But I also 
suggested that those of us on the Left should welcome any and all attempts to 
use the other interpretations in ways that advance progressive arguments. 
Fidelity to the most penetrating interpretation would otherwise prevent Leftists 
speaking to a range of constituencies in a language they understand. In the 
previous section, I claimed that the 2007-09 crisis seems not to have given 
Leftists greater room for intellectual or practical manoeuvre: there has been no 
popularisation of a robust Left programme. The implication of this is as 
follows: the Left’s problems are sufficiently wide and deep that, even during a 
period of severe economic turbulence, it has lacked the means to seize the 
moment in even a minimal sense. Other actors, institutions and forces are 
making a history and a geography to which the Left must perforce adapt and 
respond. 
In Social justice and the city, his first book as a Marxist, David Harvey 
wisely insisted that “It’s irrelevant to ask whether concepts … are ‘true’ or 
‘false’. We have to ask, rather, what it is that produces them and what they 
serve to produce” (1973: 298). This injunction – written on the eve of the last 
generalised economic crisis – should be taken to heart now as much as then. 
Ultimately, the power of rival interpretations of the recent crisis depends both 
on who is advancing them (and how) and the wider appeal of their declared or 
implicit political philosophy. But it also depends on the wider dynamics of 
social formation since these comprise the necessary context in which both the 
‘objective’ and discursive dimensions of the recent crisis play-out. The 2010 
British election will almost certainly return a Conservative government, and if 
not there will be a cross-party coalition. Notwithstanding the election of a 
black, Democratic President in the US, there is little sign of a genuinely Left-
turn in America, meaning that it resembles Britain in this respect – even 
though there are prima facie reasons for such a turn to occur in both countries. 
The Left’s current (and long-standing) marginality in American politics has its 
own causes; its situation is to be explained in ways different to the British 
Left’s plight, even though both constituencies have a common experience 
hegemonic neoliberalism leading up to 2007. For Leftists on both sides of the 
Atlantic, the lessons of the recent crisis are serious and should be very sobering. 
The political and moral economy of putatively laissez faire capitalism will remain 
entrenched in the Anglo-American world until and unless the Left raises its 
game considerably. That latter is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition 
for the eclipse of the former. The challenge, I fear, will be insurmountable in 
even the medium-term future. 
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